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Teaching the Divine Comedy’s  
Understanding of Philosophy
Jason Aleksander
The intensity of debates in the secondary literature about what “philosophy” 
might have meant to the author of the Divine Comedy (especially in light of its 
palinodic references to Dante’s Convivio) suggests that the question may be 
insoluble.1 Still, because the question is implicated in Dante’s representations 
of both philosophers and theologians (including a great number of speakers 
in Paradiso), it is bound up with many of the text’s most important concerns. 
In fact, it is worth keeping in mind that students will first encounter the 
question of the Divine Comedy’s understanding of philosophy very early in 
the text, certainly no later than in the representations of those who inhabit 
the portion of Limbo usually interpreted as Dante’s depiction of the Elysian 
Fields. In its narrative voice, the Divine Comedy reports that these souls, with 
slow, grave eyes and great authority in their countenances, speak seldom and 
with soft voices (Inferno IV, 112 – 14); among them, Dante depicts Aristotle as 
enthroned, as it were, “among a philosophical company” in which “all gaze 
at him, all do him honor” (IV, 132 – 33).
First- time readers of the Divine Comedy frequently seem tempted to 
read Inferno IV as identifying philosophy with a particular kind of spiritual 
failure, probably because they tend to harbor a superficial understanding 
of medieval conceptions of the relationship between faith and reason. This 
understanding is also perhaps abetted by allegorical readings of the Comedy 
that explicitly associate Virgil with reason and so interpret Virgil’s fate as 
testimony for Dante’s own supposed indictment of reason’s significance in 
human affairs. In any case, the text tells us only that souls in Limbo are 
damned because of a lack of faith or signs of proper adoration of God (Inferno 
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IV, 34 – 42). Thus, it is helpful to suggest to those who hastily indict philoso-
phy at this early point in the journey that the pilgrim will encounter other 
souls — souls of the elect — who exemplify virtues that Dante may intend to 
associate with the authority of philosophy.
Still, the assumption that Inferno IV condemns philosophy, false 
though it may be, harbors a reasonable intuition about the poem’s distinction 
between the respective authoritativeness of theology and philosophy. While 
medieval European thinkers tended to insist on the overlapping concerns of 
philosophy and theology, appreciating the Divine Comedy’s understanding 
of philosophy requires attending to the ways in which the poem demarcates 
these two fields. These differences are, of course, rooted in these disciplines’ 
respective attitudes toward the legitimacy of faith as a form of knowledge 
about possibilities for human happiness. Consequently, teaching the Divine 
Comedy’s understanding of philosophy depends upon the extent to which a 
professor is willing to take up the topic of Dante’s understanding of the rela-
tionship between faith and reason.
Paradiso provides the most significant passages that relate to this 
topic. Of particular importance is Peter’s examination of the pilgrim’s under-
standing of the nature of faith in Canto XXIV. In his initial response to 
Peter’s request for a definition of faith, the pilgrim refers directly to the one 
given in Hebrews 11.1: “Faith is the substance (sustanza) of things hoped for 
and argument (argomento)2 of those that do not appear, and this seems to me 
its quiddity” (XXIV, 64 – 66). But in the discussion that follows, the pilgrim 
offers a perspective that is reminiscent of, for instance, Thomas Aquinas’s 
discussions of this definition in De veritate (q14 a2) and Summa theologica 
(II – II q4 a1). Significantly, the pilgrim seems to assert that faith and reason 
are complementary rather than antagonistic: “ ‘I believe in one God, sole and 
eternal, who moves all the heavens, unmoved, with love and desire, and for 
this belief I have not only proofs physical and metaphysical, but that provided 
me by the truth that rains down from here through Moses, through prophets, 
and through psalms, through the Gospel and through all of you, who wrote 
when the burning Spirit made you nourishers’ ” (XXIV, 130 – 38). Similarly, 
in Paradiso XXVI, when John the Apostle asks what authority compelled 
the pilgrim’s will to aim at the Good, the pilgrim’s response appears to reit-
erate Canto XXIV’s earlier indications that reason is indeed involved in the 
cultivation of the theological virtues (in this case charity): “By philosophical 
arguments (argomenti) and by authority descending from here, that love 
is necessarily imprinted on me” (XXVI, 25 – 27). On the other hand, even 
though reason — and specifically philosophical argomenti — is involved in 
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the cultivation of the theological virtues, it is true that for Dante faith is the 
root of the theological virtues since only it can supply the requisite knowledge 
concerning an end that is beyond the grasp of reason.3
The issue of the relationship between reason and the theological vir-
tues is but one way of approaching the question of Dante’s understanding of 
the significance of philosophical activity. Philosophy, according to the tradi-
tion of its own self- understanding, does not depend upon faith for premises 
in its arguments. But because Dante likely accepted the commonplace medi-
eval doctrine that truth cannot contradict truth, the Divine Comedy likely 
expresses the notion that, even without relying on principles supplied by rev-
elation, philosophy’s conclusions enjoy an important and legitimate authority 
in guiding human action. That is, because the created world at every point 
manifests the will of its divine author, philosophical reasoning would be a 
legitimate mode of human discourse insofar as it orients human beings to the 
felicities that are most proper to the species. Thus, whereas natural reason 
alone is not a sufficient condition for salvation, it may nevertheless be a neces-
sary condition since it is involved in the cultivation of the ethical, intellectual, 
and theological virtues.
To help students appreciate the Divine Comedy’s assessment of the 
significance of philosophy in this regard, I think it is necessary to encourage 
them to tackle another challenging issue. Since the question of human hap-
piness is tied to Dante’s understanding of the hierarchy of human virtues, 
it behooves the teacher to draw students’ attention to the Divine Comedy’s 
treatment of the activity that Aristotle associated with sophia, the virtue he 
praised as most important in human happiness. Whereas Aristotle is explicit 
that contemplation is the most complete and self- sufficient of human activities 
(Nichomachean Ethics 6.7 and 10.7 – 8), the Divine Comedy seems to chal-
lenge this understanding in a number of ways. An interesting example of this 
might be seen in Dante’s representation of Belacqua in Purgatorio IV, a scene 
students relish for its humor. Here Dante represents Belacqua as inhabiting 
one of the lowest terraces of Mount Purgatory, where, rather than making the 
effort to strive for ethical purification, he sits, perhaps contemplating the sun 
by pondering shadows (his head is turned down rather than up), in the cool-
ness of the shade (see esp. IV, 109 – 26).4
Moments such as the representation of the inert Belacqua or Cato’s 
rebuke of Casella’s sweet singing (see Purgatorio II, 112 – 33) can be under-
stood as chastising misdirected philosophical contemplation as a kind of 
moral negligence. But Dante’s perspective may challenge not only traditional 
understandings of philosophy’s authority with respect to its investigation of 
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metaphysical questions but also the grounds of theology’s authority in that 
Dante perhaps suggests that even theological speculation may be of negli-
gible practical value to the cultivation of whatever beatitudes are possible 
for human beings. An obvious example occurs in Beatrice’s reference to St. 
Gregory’s having learned of his errors concerning the order of angels and 
laughing at himself for them (Paradiso XXVIII, 133 – 35). Moreover, since 
these examples may suggest that erring on a matter of theological specula-
tion is not necessarily a sin, they also pose a question for students about the 
nature of the Divine Comedy’s own authority as a theological text. That is, if 
the Divine Comedy suggests that the veracity of theological claims is to some 
extent irrelevant to the question of the cultivation of virtue (and hence also to 
the question of salvation and damnation), then how are we to read a text that 
is so deliberately framed for us by its own explicitly theological perspective? 
This kind of question is, of course, very much of the kind that is involved in 
serious Dante scholarship,5 but it is always a pleasure to see students take it 
up with enthusiasm in the classroom.
Ultimately, however, I believe that Dante’s attitude toward the limits 
of human reason (whether related to metaphysical or theological concerns) is 
best summarized in one of Virgil’s more tragically inflected statements:
He is mad who hopes that our reason can traverse the infinite way taken by one 
Substance in three Persons. Be content, human people, with the quia; for if you had 
been able to see everything, there was no need for Mary to give birth; and you have 
seen those yearning fruitlessly whose desire would be stilled, which is given them 
eternally for their grief: I speak of Aristotle and Plato and many other”; and here he 
bent his brow and said no more, and remained troubled. (Purgatorio III, 34 – 45)
It is my belief that Virgil’s troubled silence here is tragic because of what it 
reveals about him (not because of what it allegorically reveals about human 
reason) — because his fate is here disclosed as the ultimate expression of his 
character. But whether or not my readers (or my students) share my interpre-
tation of this passage, the passage offers several points worth attending to 
for teachers of the Divine Comedy. First, it provides an occasion to ponder 
the narrative reasons for or the allegorical justice of Virgil’s damnation.6 By 
extension, this statement challenges students to consider the extent to which 
the damnation of non- Christian philosophers compels any kind of conclu-
sion about the nature of philosophy itself. Put differently, Virgil’s tragic self- 
knowledge challenges students to understand that although (as I have pointed 
out above) theological and philosophical speculation may seem to stand on 
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equal footing with regard to their earthly fruits, they remain on unequal foot-
ing with respect to their fundamental orientation vis- à- vis the cultivation of 
the theological virtues. Whereas philosophy conspicuously rejects the guid-
ance of faith on metaphysical questions, theology embraces it. This does not 
in itself make theology a more pertinent guide to moral conduct, but it does 
mean that the theologian will tend to stand on better ground insofar as his 
or her own speculations will already have been oriented by a virtue that is 
pertinent to the possibility of salvation.
This point also raises the question of the Divine Comedy’s treatment 
of the relationship between the active and the contemplative life. On the one 
hand, as discussed above, Dante seems to depict contemplative activity as, at 
best, irrelevant to the question of salvation and, at worst, a possible cause of 
moral failure. On the other hand, Dante also depicts the souls in heaven in 
ways that associate the contemplative life with the highest human beatitude. 
These depictions might seem to contradict the point concerning Dante’s 
devaluation of the practical significance of contemplation. However, Dante’s 
view in this regard may not be so different from that of St. Thomas, who 
writes of the virtue associated with contemplative activity that it is highest in 
an absolute sense but not with respect to the production of the very conditions 
that make it possible. Indeed, because Dante’s own perspective on the rela-
tionship between the active life and the contemplative life can seem confusing 
to students, I have found it helpful to provide at least a thumbnail sketch of 
relevant passages of Thomas’s Summa theologica (especially I – II q55 – 67 
or, even more succinctly, II – II q179 – 82) or Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics 
10.7 – 8 along with the relevant sections of Thomas’s Commentary on it.
Irrespective of the extent to which Dante’s view accords with Thom-
as’s, it does seem clear throughout the Divine Comedy that philosophy has 
little to recommend it in terms of its traditional claims to authoritativeness 
vis- à- vis its metaphysical preoccupations. On the other hand, it is also pos-
sible, I think, to make the case that the Divine Comedy reveres philosophy 
as the highest of earthly authorities insofar as it limits its scope to the issues 
most proper to it. This raises the last issue concerning which I think it is 
worth calling attention to the Divine Comedy’s understanding of the nature 
and value of philosophical activity. To get at this issue, I think it is worth 
beginning with a hint that is provided in Convivio, where Dante discusses the 
necessity of a unification of philosophical and political authority:
[Aristotle’s] authority is not opposed to the imperial authority; but the latter 
authority without the former creates a danger, and the former authority without 
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the latter creates a weakness, not inherently, but as a result of the lack of harmony 
among the people. When the one is united with the other they are of the greatest 
utility and possess the most complete power. Therefore it is written in the book of 
Wisdom, “Love the light of wisdom, all you who are before the people,” which is to 
say, “Let the philosophic be united with the imperial authority, for good and perfect 
government.” (4.6.17 – 18)
Dante’s point here is that the practical moral guidance of philosophy is 
crucial for establishing just rule. However, in this passage, he also depicts 
philosophy — embodied by Aristotle most of all — as unable to produce virtue 
without the assistance of the laws.
There are two cantos in the Divine Comedy in which this view 
receives special consideration. The first is Purgatorio XVI, where Marco 
offers the following diagnosis of the cause of civil strife in the Italy of Dante’s 
day: “ ‘Rome, which made the good world, used to have two suns that made 
visible the two paths, of the world and of God. One sun has extinguished the 
other, and the sword is joined to the shepherd’s staff, and it is ill for those two 
to be violently forced together, for, joined, neither fears the other’ ” (106 – 12). 
Marco’s speech here reveals a political philosophy that is articulated explic-
itly and in greater detail in both Convivio and Monarchia, but the conclusion 
is obvious anyway: for Dante, good governance, provided only by a universal 
monarch whose authority is inviolable, is in fact the very thing that makes 
it possible for the spiritual authority of the Church to guide human beings 
effectively. Specifically, this universal secular authority provides the civil 
peace necessary for the cultivation of ethical virtue as well as the conditions 
under which citizens might best attend to their spiritual needs. Accordingly, 
where Marco asserts in Purgatorio (XVI, 91 – 96) that either a guide or reins 
would be necessary to turn human appetite away from base pleasures so that 
the human being may be genuinely happy, the extrinsic “reins” would be the 
laws, whereas the intrinsic “guide” would be philosophy as ethics.
Students find this canto to be a helpful access to Dante’s political 
philosophy, and it is worth attending to for this reason alone. However, even 
while it roughly concurs with the political philosophy articulated in both 
Monarchia and Convivio, it does not explicitly refer to the political signifi-
cance of philosophy, and I would suggest attending to Dante’s arguments in 
these other sources. But for the intrepid student who wishes to pursue the 
topic in Divine Comedy, Thomas’s discussion of Solomon’s “regal prudence” 
in Paradiso XIII provides an important confirmation since Solomon is there 
depicted as having bound together both the force of law and the moral insight 
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of philosophy — not because he asked for the wisdom associated with contem-
plative activity, but because he requested the kind of wisdom that would be 
useful for a king:
“I have not spoken in such a way that you cannot see clearly that he was a king 
who asked for the wisdom to be a worthy king, not in order to know the number of 
the Movers up here, or if necesse with contingent ever made necesse, not si est dare 
primum motum esse, or whether in a semicircle one can make a triangle that lacks a 
right angle. Thus, if you consider this and what I have said, the prudence of a king is 
that unequaled seeing at which the arrow of my intention strikes.” (94 – 105)
This characterization of Solomon tells us that, for Dante, wisdom is refigured 
as being esteemed for its practical value rather than its value in a contempla-
tive life. In refiguring wisdom in this way, Dante, I believe, associates phi-
losophy most of all with the virtue of prudence — the virtue Aristotle called 
phronesis and discusses at length in Nicomachean Ethics (6.8 – 13).7
To conclude, let me recapitulate the five main topoi through which I 
believe students might be encouraged to explore the question of the Divine 
Comedy’s understanding of philosophy. These topoi involve the Divine Com-
edy’s concerns with (1) the infernal status of noble pagans who are allegori-
cally or historically associated with philosophy or natural reason, (2) the 
relationship between faith and reason and its consequences for the text’s 
understanding of the respective authoritativeness of theology and philosophy, 
(3) the practical value of philosophical (not to mention theological) specula-
tion, (4) the respective merits of practical and contemplative activities, and 
(5) philosophy’s authority with respect to ethical and political questions. 
This fifth topic — the Divine Comedy’s concerns with philosophy’s practical 
authority — deserves a final additional comment. If I am right that the ques-
tion of the Divine Comedy’s understanding of philosophy is intimately bound 
up with the text’s construction of its authoritative voice in matters of ethics 
and politics, then it is also true that helping students question and discuss the 
text’s assertion of its relevance to the lives of its readers should entail active 
encouragement that they consider the poem’s understanding of and appeal to 
philosophy’s authority.
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Notes
1.  Significant scholarly discussions of the Divine Comedy’s understanding of philosophy 
can be found in Foster 1965, Gilson ([1949] 1963), and Stone 2006. Significant 
scholarly discussions of the import of the Divine Comedy’s palinodic references to the 
Convivio include Freccero 1973; Hollander 1975, 1990; Pertile 1993; Scott 1990, 1991, 
1995; and Ascoli 1995.
2.  Most English versions of the Vulgate translate the Latin “argumentum” in Hebrews 
11.1 with “evidence.” Similarly, most translators render Dante’s “argomento” in 
Paradiso XXIV with “evidence.” This is a teachable moment, and it reinforces 
the point I have made above concerning the value of providing students with some 
background on medieval philosophy and theology. Thomas Aquinas, for instance, 
explicitly discusses four main meanings of “argumentum” in De veritate (q14 a2 
ad9), and only one of these possible meanings corresponds directly with “evidence.” 
Consequently, it is worth calling students’ attention to the varied senses Dante may 
have been drawing upon in this canto.
3.  It may be helpful to discuss with students what “knowledge” (scientia) might mean in 
this context. At the beginning of the Summa theologica, for instance, Thomas Aquinas 
distinguishes between scientiae that are rooted in natural reason and the peculiar kind 
of scientia that theology involves (see especially I q1 a2).
4.  Belacqua is generally regarded as a musician that Dante had known in Florence. 
Nonetheless, his representation in Purgatorio IV seems to me to suggest a 
contemplative rather than musical posture.
5.  To mention but two recent examples, Barolini 1992 specifically discusses the formal 
significance of theology to the poem’s narrative framework, and Ascoli 2008 discusses 
Dante’s general strategies for attempting to establish his own poetic auctoritas.
6.  An accessible introduction to discussions of the narrative logic and/or theological 
doctrine in the representation of Virgil may be found in the exchange between 
Mowbray Allan and Teodolinda Barolini (Allan 1989, 1990; Barolini 1990a, 1990b). 
In relation to the question of the Divine Comedy’s understanding of philosophy, other 
significant discussions of  Virgil include Barolini 1984, 201 – 69; Foster 1977, 156 – 253; 
and Singleton 1956.
7.  For a fuller articulation of this argument, see Aleksander 2011. Other discussions 
of Dante’s representation of Solomon’s wisdom in the Heaven of the Sun include 
Kirkpatrick 1978, Simpson 1989, Mazzotta 2003, and Williams 2005.
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